The paper outlines an approach to the formal representation of signalling conventions, emphasising the prominent role played therein by a particular type of normative modality. It is then argued that, in terms of inferencing related to this modality, a solution can be given to the task J.L. Austin set but failed to resolve: finding a criterion for distinguishing between what Austin called constatives and performatives. The remainder of the paper indicates the importance of the normative modality in understanding a closely related issue: reasoning about trust in communication scenarios; this, in turn, facilitates a clear formal articulation of the role of a Trusted Third Party in trade communication.
Introduction
The approach to the analysis of communicative acts taken in this paper differs from those currently most in vogue, in that its focus is neither on the intentions of communicators (FIPA: http://www.fipa.org/, and in particular http://www.fipa.org/repository/bysubject.html and http://www.fipa.org/repository/aclspecs.html 1 ) nor on their supposed commitments [1, 2] . By contrast, the focus here is on the conventions that-as we shall say-constitute any given communication system s. These conventions make possible the performance of meaningful communicative acts by the agents, human or electronic, who have adopted s as a means of communicating with each other. We begin by summarising some of the main features of the approach.
Signalling conventions
A convention-based system that defines a framework for agent interaction may appropriately be called an institution. 2 In common with other institutions, communication systems exist to serve a purpose; specifically, their purpose, or point, obviously, is to facilitate the transmission of information of various kinds.
In order to develop these intuitions, and to begin to move towards a formal model, we look first at the communicative act of asserting (or stating, or saying) that such-and-such is the case. The key question is this: in the constitution of communication system/institution s, what is it that makes it possible for an agent, if he so wishes, to make an assertion? Our answer is that s contains conventions according to which the performance of particular acts count as assertions, and which also specify what those acts mean. Consider, by way of illustration, the institution that was once operative for sea-going vessels, in virtue of which they were able to send signals indicating aspects of the state of a vessel by hoisting sequences of flags. Raising flag sequence q1 would count (by convention) as a means of saying that the vessel was carrying explosives, raising flag-sequence q2 would conventionally count as indicating that the vessel carried injured crew members. . . and so on. Note the general form of the conventions themselves: they each associate a particular type of act with a particular state of affairs, and because they are conventions for asserting (i.e., for that type of communicative act) they each count as a means of saying that the associated state of affairs holds.
For present purposes, it matters not at all which sorts of acts are used in a given communication system; the account of communication conventions we offer is entirely neutral on that issue. 3 Suppose now that in communication system/institution s, the act of bringing it about that A counts as a means of asserting that the state of affairs described by B obtains (abbreviating: by convention in s, doing A counts as an assertion that B). And suppose further that agent j , who is an s-user, does A in circumstances in which B does not hold. 4 Then it is appropriate to say that, from the point of view of the institution s, something has gone wrong, in as much as the purpose or function within institution s of acts of asserting is to facilitate the transmission of reliable information. The point of asserting, as an institutionalised act, is to be able to show how things stand in a given state of affairs. Given that this is the point of asserting, the doing of A in circumstances where B does not hold is a form of abuse of the system. Relative to the purpose of asserting, as an institutionalised act, A ought to be done only when B is the case, and so the doing of A in non-B circumstances amounts to a deviation from the ideal that the system is supposed to achieve. 5 The conventions for asserting make it possible for acts of assertion to be performed, and they do so by indicating what would be the case in circumstances in which the purpose of asserting, qua institutionalised act, is fulfilled. If, by convention in s, doing A counts as an assertion that B, then in ideal circumstances (with respect to s) B holds whenever A is done. These observations are the key to understanding the intuitions on which is grounded the general logical form we assign to communication conventions of the assertoric type. 6 Following the theory developed in [3] and [4] , the form of the signalling convention (sc) according to which, in s, agent j 's seeing to it that A counts as an assertion that B, is given by
where expressions of the form E j A are read 'j sees to it that A', ⇒ s is the 'counts as' connective of [9] , and I * s is a normative operator, intended to capture the sense of 'ought', or ideality, alluded to above. Details of the logics 2 This section offers merely a summary of the approach to signalling conventions described in [3] and [4] , and the reader is referred to those sources-particularly to [4] -for a more detailed account, including details of the component modalities. The focus of the present paper is on the normative aspect of signalling conventions, and its relation to trust and to Austin's distinction between performative and constative. 3 By 'communication system' we here mean the set of conventions that constitute the system, together with the set of agents who make use of those conventions. 4 It is irrelevant to the present point whether or not j believes that B does not hold. 5 One of the reviewers helpfully pointed out that this way of characterising the purpose of asserting strongly suggests an analysis of 'ought' along Andersonian lines, relating failure to violation. In fact, in the first-order simplification of our account outlined in [5] -see below Section 5-a reduction of a similar kind is indeed proposed. 6 [6] is the source from which we take the idea that, in order to understand the communicative act of asserting, one must understand in what sense of 'ought' that which is asserted ought to be true. Stenius's much neglected paper is in our opinion one of the most insightful essays written on the analysis of different types of communicative acts. The idea that the 'counts as' notion figures crucially in the convention constituting asserting appears for the first time, to our knowledge, in [7] . For further discussion of the philosophical roots of our approach, see [8] .
and semantics for the action and 'counts as' modalities are given in [9] . 7 Expressions of the form (sc-assert) say that j 's seeing to it that A counts in conventional signalling system s as a means of indicating that, were s to be in an ideal/optimal state with respect to its function of facilitating the transmission of reliable information, B would be true. The logic of the normative modality is that of a (relativised) normal modality of type K. Closure under logical consequence is a natural assumption, given the intended interpretation of the operator, for if a signalling system would be in an ideal state only if B were true, then it would be in an ideal state only if the logical consequences of B were also true. Note also (cf. [10, p.184] ) that the absence of the D. schema reflects the obvious fact that mutually inconsistent assertions can be made: according to one of them, B ought to be true, but according to the other, B ought to be false.
Such other types of communicative acts as commanding, promising, requesting and declaring (the latter in the sense of [11] ) are characterised in terms of signalling conventions of the same basic form as that of (sc-assert) with, crucially, some further elaboration of the scope-formula B falling to the immediate right of the I * s operator in the consequent (cf. [3] and [4] ). This means, of course, that each of these communicative act-types is here treated as a sub-species of the act of asserting, a consequence of the fact that-in stark contrast to Austin [12] -we take all communicative acts to be acts of transmitting signals which may, or may not, be true. We shall see in due course how this approach provides the basis for formally articulating the distinction that Austin sought, but failed to capture, between what he called constatives and performatives.
The form of the signalling convention for commanding is (sc-command) E j A ⇒ s I * s OE k B where the O operator is a directive normative modality representing obligation. (We do not here specify a logic of obligation, since it is not the focus of our concern. For present purposes, SDL (standard deontic logic) would suffice.) According to (sc-command), if j sees to it that A, s would then be in an ideal state (things would then be as they ought to be), relative to s's function of facilitating the transmission of reliable information, if there were then an obligation on k (the agent to whom the command is addressed) to see to it that B (where B is the state of affairs that k is commanded to bring about).
The form of the signalling convention for promising is (sc-promise) E j A ⇒ s I * s OE j B According to (sc-promise), if j sees to it that A, s would then be in an ideal state (things would then be as they ought to be), relative to s's function of facilitating the transmission of reliable information, if there were then an obligation on j (the agent making the promise) to see to it that B (where B is the state of affairs that j promises to bring about). 8 The form of the signalling convention for requesting is (sc-request) E j A ⇒ s I * s H j E k B where expressions of the form H j A are read 'j attempts to see to it that A', and the logic of the attempts operator is essentially that of the action operator minus the 'success' condition (the T. schema). According to (sc-request), if j sees to it that A, s would then be in an ideal state (things would then be as they ought to be), relative to s's function of facilitating the transmission of reliable information, if j were attempting to get k to see to it that B.
The point of declaratives is to create a new state of affairs, as when, for instance, a couple are declared married, or a meeting is declared open. Let j be the agent issuing the declarative, and let B describe the state of affairs to be created by the performance of the declarative. Then the form of the governing convention is
There is, however, a point of difference between the present treatment of 'counts as' and the account given in [9] , in as much as the role of the ideality operator in our analysis of signalling conventions obviates the need for the D-operator as that was employed in [9] . 8 We accept that a case can be made for inserting the operator E j immediately to the left of the obligation operator in the consequent of (sccommand) and (sc-promise), since it is the agent j who, by performing the communicative act E j A, sees to it that the obligation is created. A move of that sort would then make commanding and promising sub-species of declaring (see below), which is perhaps a very natural way of viewing these matters. A change of this kind could be made without necessitating revision of the main points addressed in this paper.
According to (sc-declare), if j sees to it that A, s would then be in an ideal state (things would then be as they ought to be), relative to s's function of facilitating the transmission of reliable information, if it were then the case that j has indeed seen to it that B.
Distinguishing constatives from performatives
Austin sought a grammatical criterion for distinguishing between constative sentences (characteristically used in communicative acts the point of which is essentially to state or assert that such-and-such is the case) and performative sentences, which are characteristically employed-as he saw it-in doing the other kinds of things that one does with words, i.e., other than stating/asserting, such as giving orders, accepting offers, making promises, opening meetings and naming ships. The first seven lectures recorded in the posthumously published How to Do Things with Words [12] describe his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to define an appropriate distinguishing criterion-a criterion compatible with the basic assumption he made to the effect that performative sentences, unlike constatives, lack truth values. On our view it was in part that very assumption that prevented him from finding what he sought. 9 We have characterised four types of performatives (commanding, promising, requesting and declaring) in terms of conventions that are all special cases of the convention for asserting, (sc-assert). So we are maintaining that the general form of all of these conventions is expressed by (sc-assert). Suppose now that agents j and k are users of communication system s, and that they are mutually aware of the content of the various instances of (sc-assert), each of which shows what the communicative acts performable in s mean. (j 's seeing to it that A1 counts as an assertion that B1, j 's seeing to it that A2 counts as an assertion that B2, j 's seeing to it that A3 counts as a command to do B3, j 's seeing to it that A4 counts as a request to do B4 . . . and so on. The particular instances of (sc-assert) are, we may say, the code that constitutes s.)
In terms of the general form of communicative conventions, as expressed by (sc-assert), we may say that k, on witnessing j 's performance of the act E j A, forms a belief 10 the content of which is the consequent of (sc-assert): 11 (1)
The key question now is this: under what conditions would k, as a rational agent, be prepared to trust the reliability of j 's communicative act, and move from the belief expressed by (1) to (2)?
Crucially, the answer to this question will depend on whether j 's act is a performative or a constative, in Austin's sense. If it is a performative (for instance, one of the four types mentioned above) then k will be justified in making the inference from (1) to (2) provided merely that j is relevantly empowered-i.e., empowered to give commands, or empowered to make requests, or empowered to make promises, or empowered to make declarations. Consider commanding: if j is empowered/authorised to give commands, then his performance of the communicative act of commanding will indeed create an obligation on the addressee, k, to see to it that B. The scope formula to the right of the I * s operator in the convention is made true by j 's performance of the communicative act. If he is empowered, then 'saying makes it so'.
The situation with respect to constatives, however, is quite different, for here there is no notion of empowerment or authorisation which would itself license the inference of B from I * s B. The closest one could get to such a notion would arise in cases in which j is deemed to be an authority on the subject about which he is making an assertion. But even then, his saying that B does not in itself make it the case that B. The signal he transmits is not 'verifiable by its use', but by appeal to the facts on which he is deemed to have expert, or authoritative, knowledge.
Does this analysis do justice to a distinction-considered by Austin to be important-between fully performative and merely descriptive usage of performative sentences? To explain the question, consider the utterance by the officer- 9 What follows in due course below has its roots, in part at least, in an old idea. A number of early contributors to the literature on performatives (Lemmon, Åqvist and Lewis among them) suggested that the characteristic feature of performatives, in contrast to constatives, was 'verifiability by use', or the fact that 'saying makes it so'. See [8] for references and discussion. 10 For present purposes we shall assume that the belief modality is assigned the logic of a relativised normal modality of type KD. 11 This is the default conclusion k will draw, on the assumption that j 's act is a serious communicative act, i.e., a literal implementation of the governing (sc-assert) convention. For more detail on this, see [3] .
in-command of the performative sentence 'I command you to open fire' in two different contexts: in the first, he is using the utterance itself to give the command (the fully performative usage), but in the second he is giving the command by signing a written order, and uttering the sentence 'I command you to open fire' so as to describe what (by signing) he is doing. The answer to the question is surely affirmative, for the difference between the two cases lies precisely in the evidence that would be required in order to justify inferring that an obligation (to open fire) had been created. For the fully performative case, the inference is justified if the communicator is indeed empowered to issue commands. But in the descriptive case more evidence is needed, for there the inference is justified only if it is the case both that the communicator is empowered to command and that he is performing another action by means of which he is exercising that authority (signing the written order). The descriptive case falls then in the category of constatives, according to our criterion, and this is surely in line with the point Austin had in mind regarding these different usages of performative sentences.
Towards the end of Lecture VII in [12] , Austin gives up the pursuit of a distinguishing criterion. He says this:
Now we failed to find a grammatical criterion for performatives, but we thought that perhaps we could insist that every performative could be in principle put into the form of an explicit performative, and then we could make a list of performative verbs. Since then we have found, however, that it is often not easy to be sure that, even when it is apparently in explicit form, an utterance is performative or that it is not; and typically anyway, we still have utterances beginning 'I state that . . . ' which seem to satisfy the requirements of being performative, yet which surely are the making of statements, and surely are essentially true or false.
It is time to make a fresh start on the problem. We want to reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and also perhaps to consider the different case in which by saying something we do something). [12, p. 91] And then it is in the remaining lectures that Austin developed the now familiar distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary-indeed the latter two are already hinted at in the last bit of the passage just quoted. On our view, by contrast, there is no need to despair of finding a means of distinguishing constative from performative, but one should look not for a grammatical criterion, as Austin did, but at the grounds upon which one may justifiably infer a belief of form (2), above, from a belief of form (1) .
There is also no need to resort to the theory of illocutionary acts; for we can supply a formal characterisation of different types of communicative acts-as outlined above-that makes no explicit use of the notion of illocutionarity, and which, in contrast to the approach taken by FIPA (see FIPA URLs, cited above), does not focus on the intended perlocutionary effects (what FIPA call the 'rational effects') of communication.
As indicated above, we give the analysis in terms of conventions that specify what ought to hold true when, for instance, an order is given or a request or promise is made. The normative, ideality operator is the key element, marking what will be the case if the governing convention is exploited in a way that conforms to the function that the communication/signalling system is designed to fulfil: the transmission of reliable information.
This, in turn, enables us to represent in a very straightforward way the belief of an agent who is aware of what a particular transmitted signal means (see above, formula (1)). The content of that belief is a normative expression, of form I * s B, where s is the communication system used in transmitting the signal. To be aware of what the signal means, on our view, is just to be aware of what, by convention, ought to be true given that the signal has been sent-it is to be aware of what would be the case if the reliability of the communicator could be trusted. In contrast to some other approaches to the analysis of Agent Communication Languages (ACLs), we do not need to require the recipient to believe that the communicator is intending to produce in him the belief that B or that the communicator believes that B, or the belief that the communicator intends to get him to recognise that it is the communicator's intention to get him to believe that B . . . or indeed any other part of the convoluted Gricean mechanism. 12 Our approach is very much simpler, and is made possible, essentially, by the role played by the normative operator.
We note in passing one additional advantage of our approach. First, it facilitates third party determination of what is said. Conventions, unlike intentions, beliefs, and desires, are quite public and open to objective assessment by disinterested parties. This is a key property if disputes are to be resolved in a manner that discourages cheating and 12 A considerably more detailed critique of the Gricean approach-in which of course the FIPA approach has its roots-is to be found in [8, Chapter 4].
reneging. Intentions, beliefs, desires and other mental states are, perhaps, not entirely inaccessible to neutral third parties. Even so, they are quite problematic in comparison to established conventions. This is apparent in the case of commercial transactions and electronic commerce in particular, but the point applies in the large, to all forms of communication for which it is valuable to be able to ascertain what was said in a fair and objective way.
Reasoning about messages received
As we have seen, the formal characterisation of the belief state of a message recipient k enables us to represent what it would be for k to trust the reliability of the message sent: k would make the transition from a belief of type (1) to a belief of type (2) . The formalism also facilitates the representation of the reasoning of k in a situation prior to that in which he has decided whether or not to trust messages he has received. This is important at least for the reason that, in trying to determine whether trust is justified, k-as a rational agent-will want to evaluate the consistency of the messages he has received with other beliefs he already holds.
To illustrate, suppose that k has received a message asserting that B, and a message asserting the conditional 'if B then C'. Then (4) and (5) that (6) B k I * s C Suppose now that, prior to receiving the two assertions, k already had the belief that C is false, i.e., B k ¬C. Since the D. schema holds for the belief modality, it now follows that ¬B k C, from which it follows by the normality of the belief modality that
From this it now follows that k cannot trust both of the messages he has received, so long as he retains his belief (which he might, of course, choose to revise) that C is false. This is a rather simple example, but it nevertheless serves to exhibit how the combination of the logics of the belief and ideality operators may be used to represent aspects of the recipient k's reasoning, as he tries to work out which messages he can trust.
The speech-act theory literature has not paid a great deal of attention to the reliability of communicative acts; by contrast, however, issues pertaining to the sincerity of the communicator have figured prominently. There is, of course, an associated notion of trust here too. In terms of the general form of communicative conventions, as expressed by (sc-assert), we may say that an agent k trusts the sincerity of agent j 's communicative act if, having witnessed j 's performance of the act E j A, and having then formed a belief of type (1), he then goes on to form the belief expressed by:
Cases in which an agent trusts both the reliability and the sincerity of a communicative act are commonplace. Similarly, lack of trust in reliability often goes hand-in-hand with lack of trust in sincerity. Furthermore, we may also have cases in which an agent trusts the sincerity of a communicator, but not his reliability-the communicator j is deemed to be describing the situation to the best of his knowledge and belief, but the source of j 's information is deemed to be unreliable. Finally, and less frequently, there may be cases in which communicator j is deemed by the audience to be insincere, and yet the audience trusts that the message he sends is reliable: the audience rightly thinks that the communicator is trying to deceive them, but-unbeknown to the communicator-the information he is transmitting is known by the audience to be from a reliable source.
The distinction between trust in reliability and trust in sincerity also affords a means of explaining Moore's problem about 'saying and disbelieving' [13, p. 125] . In essence the problem is that while the sentence (8) A but I do not believe that A is not a logical contradiction, there is nevertheless something logically odd about it, and it is the nature of this logical oddity that needs to be explained.
Consider an act of uttering sentence (8) from the point of view of an audience k, and suppose that the utterer is (correctly) believed by k to be j . Suppose further that k trusts the reliability of the utterance. Then (9) itself is logically consistent. And, given that we do not adopt the positive introspection axiom for the logic of belief, so is (11). However, (10) and (12) together represent incompatible beliefs of the agent k-logically incompatible beliefs if, as is usual, the D. schema holds for the logic of belief.
Thus, in relation to the previous discussion of the two types of audience trust, the diagnosis of the Moore problem is this: in contrast with most ordinary utterances, the two types of trusting attitude are here incompatible. The audience can trust the reliability of an utterance of (8) if and only if he does not trust its sincerity. (Equivalently, trust in sincerity is possible if and only if the utterance is deemed unreliable.)
We see two advantages of this explanation of the puzzle, as compared to that offered by Hintikka ([14, § §4.5-4.7]). First, our diagnosis explains the defective nature of the communication of (8) , rather than considering (8) merely from the point of view of what the agent referred to by 'I' could himself believe about (8) . Secondly, Hintikka's explanation of the logical oddity, unlike ours, turns essentially on his acceptance of the positive introspection axiom (the schema 4 in the Chellas classification) for the logic of belief. In our opinion, the informally stated explanation of the puzzle offered by Searle [7, p. 65 , Footnote 1] is essentially the same as Hintikka's. Its focus is on the communicator's sincerity, and does not make explicit the tension between sincerity and reliability which we see as the key to Moore's puzzle.
Business communication and the Trusted Third Party
In [5] and [15] we develop a synthesis of Jones's convention-based analysis of communicative acts and Kimbrough's FLBC (Formal Language for Business Communication, see [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] ), together with a detailed look at how the resulting combined formal models might be applied to the description of a trading scenario, involving, essentially, a buyer, a seller and a TTP (Trusted Third Party). Both [5] and [23] also discuss design of a Prolog implementation of the combined model. This combined model affords the prospect of deep and, we believe, plausibly complete formal integration of the theory described in this paper with the mundane, but complex, requirements of modern transaction processing. Moreover, we believe that the combined model will facilitate, in an entirely practicable and deployable manner, automated reasoning about communicated messages. These claims are under development and investigation. We content ourselves here with a brief indication of how the notions of conventional signalling systems, discussed in this paper, may be extended to support reasoning with additional sources of information.
Consider, then, a scenario in which a seller of goods and a prospective buyer communicate with each other not directly, but via a TTP. The seller, v, and the buyer, b, send via TTP messages of various kinds, which will typically include (among others) messages that serve to state facts about available goods and their mode of delivery, to request information, and-if a deal is initiated-to create obligations. As the recipient of these messages, the TTP (agent t ) forms a set of beliefs of the type exhibited by (13) B t I * s B (cf. (1), above) where, as we have earlier emphasised, the scope formula to the right of the I * s operator may take a number of different forms, depending on the nature of the communicative act performed.
In terms of our formal theory, the role of the Third Party, qua Trusted Third Party, is easily articulated. The key task for which TTP is responsible is to determine which inferences may be accepted from schemas of type (13) and then to communicate to buyer and seller the result of his deliberations. Since t is assumed by v and b to be trusted, they will accept what he says as true (they may even be obligated to do so by the contractual agreements they made in order to participate in the system). In other words, for v and b the task of making inferences from schemas of type (1) to schemas of type (2) has been delegated to t: they trust him to do that job for them.
Read schemas of the form Says t B/A as 't says that B by seeing to it that A', where it is understood that 'says' is a generic term, referring to any type of communicative act. We define Says t B/A as follows
where, as before, it is understood (i) that s is the conventional signalling (or communication) system that the agents t , v and b have adopted (for the purposes of their trade communication) and (ii) that the scope formula B may exhibit a range of different forms, depending on which type of communicative act E t A is.
Then we may represent the trusting beliefs that v and b have, vis-à-vis t , in the following way And we may also wish to add that v and b and t are mutually aware that v and b have these trusting beliefs. 13 We might say that schemas (15) and (16) articulate the reliability-policy adopted by v and b. That is to say, this is the policy they implement in order to solve the reliability problem: the problem of deciding when to make inferences from schemas of type (1) to schemas of type (2) . In the absence of reliability-policies, it is clear that key aspects of the day-to-day operations of organisations-and indeed of interpersonal interaction in less formal settings-would break down, for the obvious reason that the agents concerned would not know which messages they should trust.
Using the services of a TTP is just one way of dealing with the reliability problem, just one type of basis for a reliability-policy, and it is presumably particularly useful in contexts in which communicating agents have no experience of each other's behaviour, such as in a 'first-trade' scenario. Moreover, even in the presence of a TTP it is easily the case that not all aspects of what is communicated will be warranted by the TTP. For example, TTP may warrant a claim by the seller that the goods shipped have been insured, but not warrant any claim by the seller as to the contents of the materials shipped. The duties of a TTP are normally circumscribed. In these and other contexts it may be more sensible to adopt quite a different type of policy, for instance a policy that pertains to what is known about the reputation of the agents involved, their previous history with respect to reliability. Alternatively, in the absence of a TTP and in the absence of reputation indicators, the policy might refer to control and/or insurance mechanisms. Then an agent would accept the truth of a message on the grounds that he believes that the expected consequences for the communicator of unreliability would effectively deter him from transmitting a falsehood. Or the agent would trust a message on the grounds that-even if it did turn out to be false-he would run no real risk since he would be adequately protected by insurance.
At the extreme, perhaps, an agent might put into place reliability-policies effecting inference from schemas of type (1) to schemas of type (2) even when the agent has good reason to believe that B is false. For example, let B be the seller's assertion that a given order has been fulfilled. Suppose that the order was for 2000 widgets exactly, but the number that actually were delivered was a little different, either higher or lower. The buyer may well want to have a policy to accept the order as fulfilled, given the seller's record (and the cost of making the necessary adjustments). The buyer might then declare the order fulfilled for the sake of accounting and payments purposes, while at the same time record accurately for inventory purposes the actual number. Such are everyday, unavoidable occurrences in commerce (although recording accurately for inventory purposes may be the exception!). Details, of course, need to be articulated, investigated and explored, but the potential for the present formal framework to accommodate these kinds of situations is indeed a significant virtue. 14 For the sake of seeing the generalisation, it may be helpful to articulate the present example formally. More carefully, then, assume that the buyer, b, has ordered exactly 2000 widgets from the vendor, v. The vendor responds by shipping a number of widgets modestly different from 2000. (Whether it is higher or lower is immaterial for this example. In practice it may be either.) The vendor also sends a message (e.g., in the form of a packing slip) asserting that the package it shipped contains exactly 2000 widgets. The buyer, b, or an agent (e.g., employee) for the buyer, b a , is at the loading dock when the package arrives. The agent's job is to inspect the package and to decide whether or not to accept it. For the sake of the example, let us assume that the agent correctly and accurately inspects the package, discerning that 2000 widgets were ordered, that it is claimed that 2000 widgets are delivered, and that in fact a number other than 2000 widgets were delivered. Let us also assume, for the sake of the example, that the variance of −2 (under-count from 2000) is, according to the buyer's policies, within the margin of tolerance for paying the vendor but not within the margin of tolerance for recording actual inventory on hand. Our agent now has something of a dilemma. If the vendor is to be paid, the number of widgets must be declared to be 2000. If the inventory system is to be kept accurately, the number of widgets must be declared accurately, 1998.
A straightforward solution is for the agent to make two declarations. The buyer's agent, b a , sees things differently and will declare to the inventory system that 1998 widgets have been delivered. Using A2 for "b a transmits the sentence '1998 widgets have been delivered' " we have: (18) E b a A2 ⇒ s I * s E b a C(1998) The agent does this by, say, recording in the inventory system records the addition of 1998 widgets. What is recorded, typically, is that 1998 widgets are added to the inventory of widgets and that agent b a did the adding (saw to it that the widget records were added). Subsequently, a user of the inventory system, x, may (typically would) believe that 1998 widgets were in fact delivered (and added to inventory)- ( 
19) B x C(1998)
-because x would trust that the ideality conditions were satisfied. The agent, on this analysis, would also record a second declaration. Letting AC(2000) stand for "there are acceptably close to 2000 widgets delivered," and using A3 for "b a transmits the sentence 'acceptably close to 2000 widgets are delivered' " the agent would declare this to be the case, viz. 1. In each case, (18) and (20) , the antecedents are modifications of a record keeping system. Typically, the agent creates or modifies computerised records of accounts. The agent is (ideally) empowered to make these changes (that's a major part of the agent's job).
2. The analysis here correctly (we submit) identifies what, ideally, is the case in consequence of these actions by the agent. Ideally the agent has seen to it that 1998 real widgets have been added to the warehouse inventory. Further, ideally the agent has been diligent and honest, and in fact any variance from the contracted amount is negligible according to company policy. 3. The two declarations can go wrong in different ways. Regarding (18) , the agent might mistakenly count the number of widgets, or lose them between the loading dock and the warehouse, or record the amount negligently or dishonestly. Regarding (20) , the agent might make the declaration mistakenly, or without attending to its accuracy, or falsely by being bribed, and so on. 4. It is not the business of logic to prevent abuses of conventions or shortfalls from ideality. Logic can, however, contribute by affording rigorous representation and accompanying clarity. Future research will be required to articulate fully the conditions that suffice to establish or defeat ideality and the plausibility of ideality. Establishing that is an important task has been one of the goals of this paper.
Finally, with respect to the formal framework we have outlined in this paper, the key point to note is that it is not in any way tied to any special assumptions about the form or content of what we are here calling 'reliability-policies'. Given our earlier critical observations about such Grice-inspired approaches as that taken by FIPA, it is particularly important that, on our account, reliability-policies need not presuppose that, to be trusted, communicating agents must have certain types of mental states or intentions.
